Poverty Alleviation and Interhousehold Transfers: Evidence from BRAC’s Graduation Program in Bangladesh

Very poor households often rely on transfers from their social networks for intake smoothing, but there is restricted proof on how antipoverty systems influence casual transfers. This paper exploits the randomized rollout of BRAC’s ultra-bad graduation program in Bangladesh and panel details covering in excess of 21,000 households in excess of seven several years to examine the program’s outcomes on interhousehold transfers. The program crowds out casual transfers received by the targeted households, but this is driven mostly by outdoors-village transfers. Addressed ultra-bad households grow to be far more probable to equally give and obtain transfers to/from wealthier households in just their village and much less probable to obtain transfers from their businesses. As a result, the reciprocity of their in just-village transfers improves. The findings indicate that, in just rural communities, there is good assortative matching by socio-financial position. A reduction in poverty enables households to interact far more in reciprocal transfer arrangements and lowers the interlinkage of their labor with casual insurance policy.